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RECENT DECISIONS
of a customer ... ." "8 Thus Sun, to retain its customer, McLean,
was entitled to the defense.
The Court is careful to note the particular circumstances of
this case, viz., the make-up of the gasoline industry in general
and the vertical integration 3 9 of Super Test in particular, but
it seems that the well-reasoned opinion has provided at least two
basic rules of construction concerning the applicability of section
2(b), which go beyond the bare facts of the decision. First,
courts are not to adhere to a strict, literal interpretation of the
wording contained in the defense. Instead, they are to look to
the individual competitive situations and be bound rather by
the spirit of the law and the overall national policy which fosters
the competitive process. Secondly, the tribunals must be careful
to keep in mind the economic realities of the market place: to
realize, for example, that sellers of competing products may be
very much in competition with each other even though they do not
sell to the same retailers.
While the Court's dismissal of the Enterprise restriction clearly
seems warranted in the Sun Oil case, the conclusion of the Fifth
Circuit cannot be applied arbitrarily to any competitive situation so
as to permit every seller to go to the aid of a struggling customer.
The Robinson-Patman Act still forbids unwarranted favoritism
among customers, and despite its numerous shortcomings, it re-
mains the law. The present case, however, is perhaps an indication
that a more realistic application of its sections will be forthcoming.
)X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE-EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
BY STATE OFFICERS HELD INADMISSIBLE IN STATE CoURT.-On
May 23, 1957 Cleveland police officers sought admittance to the
Mapp home in search of a suspected criminal and "policy para-
phernalia" believed hidden there. Miss Mapp refused them en-
trance without a warrant. Some hours later the police returned
and forced their way into the Mapp home. When asked for a
warrant they produced a piece of paper which Miss Mapp never
had an opportunity to examine. She was then handcuffed and
the house searched. During this search the police uncovered
certain obscene material, for possession of which the appellant was
38Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1951).
39Super Tests integration resulted in a competitive situation wherein a
supplier-retailer was pitted against a supplier.
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convicted. At the trial the "warrant" was never produced and
on review the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the evidence
was obtained by an illegal search and seizure but refused to
overrule the conviction.
The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision,
holding, that evidence gained by an illegal search and seizure was
inadmissible in a state prosecution, thus overruling the case of
Wolf v. Colorado.' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
In 1886, in Boyd v. United States,2 the Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction based on evidence which the defendant was
compelled to produce. It reasoned that the fourth amendment's
protection against "illegal search and seizure" and the fifth amend-
ment's protection against "self-incrimination" together barred the
use of such evidence. Nineteen years later, the soundness of this
proposition was questioned in a dictum statement in Adams v.
New York 3 where the Court expressed the opinion that the fourth
and fifth amendments were never intended to have the effect given
them in Boyd.4 It was not until 1914 in Weeks v. United States 5
that the Court adopted the so-called exclusionary rule by squarely
holding that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment
was inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, at least in the federal
courts.
6
The scope of the exclusionary rule as applied in the federal
area was left to be defined by later cases. Thus, knowledge gained
as a result of an "illegal search and seizure" was held to be
barred in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.7 And, when
the seizure was made under the guise of a "friendly visit," 8 or
when federal officers were admitted to the defendant's house by
one falsely claiming to have such authority,9 evidence so gained
was also excluded. Finally in 1959 the Court in Elkins v. United
1338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2 116 U.S. 616 (1886). It appears that the opinion of the Court in this
case was against the accepted weight of authority. See 8 WIxmoR, EVMENCE
§2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
3192 U.S. 585 (1904) (dictum).
4Id. at 598.
5232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 Ibid. The reasoning of the Court was that "if letters and private
documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no value, and,
so far as those thus are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution." Id. at 393.
7 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In this case evidence illegally seized was returned
to its owner, but the government, acting on knowledge gained through the
seizure, then properly acquired this evidence by a search warrant. However,
the Court denied its admission.
8 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
9 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
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States 10 ruled that evidence illegally seized by state officers was
inadmissible in federal prosecutions, thereby overruling the "Silver-
platter Doctrine."'1
There must, however, be an illegal search and seizure in order
for the exclusionary rule to operate. For example, where federal
officers trespassing on the defendant's land witnessed him committing
an illegal act, their testimony regarding this act was not such
evidence as would be barred by the rule.'2  It was in this frame
of reference that the Court in Ohnstead v. United States"3 held
wiretapping not to be a search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, and evidence so gained admissible.
Insofar as state prosecutions are concerned the exclusionary
rule has been, up to now, cautiously and narrowly applied. Rea v.
United States'4 prohibited federal officers from turning illegally
seized evidence over to state officials. But the Court had previously
refused to extend the exclusionary rule to purely state action in
Wolf v. Colorado." The holding there was that the core of the
fourth amendment, that is, the right of privacy, was basic to
ordered liberty and therefore applied to the states through the
"due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. But, after
considering the opinions of the states which refused to accept the
rule, it concluded that the rule was not an essential ingredient
of the right of privacy and refused to apply it to the states.'6
The Court, in the instant case, by reviewing the Wolf decision,
was faced with the question of whether or not the exclusionary
rule was implicit in the concept of -ordered liberty so as to apply
to the states through the "due process" clause. After an analysis
of the Wolf reasoning the majority concluded that the decision was
based on the factual considerations of not wishing to brush aside
the experience of two-thirds of the states, which rejected the rule,
and on the fact that there were "other means" of enforcing the
right of privacy.' 7  The majority contended that these reasons
were not relevant to a finding that the "rule" was an essential
ingredient of ordered liberty,'8 but they considered their current
validity. They reasoned that these considerations were no longer
10364 U.S. 206 (1960).
"The import of this "doctrine" was that evidence taken by state officers
in violation of the fourth amendment could be used in federal prosecutions.
For a full discussion of the EIkimn decision, see 35 ST. JOHN's L. Ra-. 139
(1960).
2Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
13277 U.S. 438 (1928).
14350 U.S. 214 (1956).
"338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21bd. at 28-33.
'17 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961).
28 Id. at 651.
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valid, 9 since the experience of the states had changed (only one-
half of them now opposing the rule), and since the "other means"
had failed to protect the right of privacy (citing California's reasons
for adopting the exclusionary rule 20 as an example).
After rejecting the reasoning of the Wolf Court, the majority
considered the constitutional basis of the exclusionary rule. Re-
viewing the prior statements of the Court in McNabb v. United
States,21 Olmstead v. United States,22 and Byer v. United States 23
the majority concluded that the constitutional origin of the rule
was well founded and that it was not a mere rule of evidence
for the federal judiciary.24
Having thus met the arguments against applying the rule
they proceeded to argue for its application. Combining the reason-
ing of Weeks to the effect that the rule was essential to the
protection of the fourth amendment, and the reasoning of Wolf
that the right of privacy was essential to ordered liberty, the
majority concluded that "without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral . . . as not to merit
this Court's high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.' " 25 Parathrasing Weeks, the Court concluded
that the right of privacy without the rule would be a mere "form
of words." 26
The dissent objected to the majority opinion on two grounds.
First, because the "pivotal" issue raised by the briefs and answered
in the Ohio Supreme Court had been the constitutionality of
the statute under which Miss Mapp was convicted. Hence, the
application of the exclusionary rule was only a minor issue.1
7
Therefore, it appeared to the dissent that the majority had reached
out to overrule Wolf, in contradiction of the principle that the
Court will answer constitutional questions only when squarely faced
with them.2 Secondly, they took issue with what they viewed
as the majority logic that because the core of the fourth amend-
'o Id. at 650-53.
20 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See also,
Note, Two Years With the Cahan Rule, 9 STAN. L. R-v. 515 (1957).21318 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943) (dictum).
22277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928) (dictum).
23273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
24 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 17, at 649-50.
25 Id. at 655.
26 Ibid. A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1959).
27 It should be noted that the Ohio court spent a considerable portion of
its opinion disposing of the issue of illegally seized evidence before it
questioned the constitutionality of the statute. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St.
427, 430, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1960).
28 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672-77 (1.961) (dissenting opinion).
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ment applied to the states, the exclusionary rule must also apply.29
Emphasizing that Wolf held the core and not the body of the
fourth amendment applicable to the states and that the fourteenth
amendment is not shorthand for the first eight amendments, they
concluded that the majority had not demonstrated that the ex-
clusionary rule was more than a configuration of the fourth amend-
ment. In not so demonstrating, the dissent felt that the Court
could not apply the rule by way of the "due process" clause
and that the majority was imposing a federal rule on the states
for the sake of uniformity.30
If the argument of the majority was that the exclusionary rule
applied to the states because it is a configuration of the fourth
amendment, the criticism of the dissent would be justified. It
appears, however, that the majority has concluded that the right
of privacy has no meaning without the rule, and therefore the rule
is necessary to ordered liberty. The majority argument then is
that the exclusionary rule applies to the states because it is
essential to due process, and not simply because it is part of the
fourth amendment.
By this decision the Court has overruled the opinions of some
twenty-four states. 31  In 1926, when faced with this problem in
People v. Defore,32 the New York Court of Appeals viewed it as
one of competing interests. "On the one side is the social need
that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need
that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office." as In
attempting to balance these interests the court rejected the federal
exclusionary rule as one bereft of consistency. It concluded that
admission of the evidence and the imposition of other sanctions
against the illegal search would best serve both interests. However,
in considering such "other sanctions" as civil actions against the
police or a criminal proceeding against the officer who made the
search, the majority, in the instant case, concluded that those
methods were ineffectual.
34
The import of this decision, however, is not its expression
291d. at 678 (dissenting opinion).
30 Id. at 682-83 (dissenting opinion).
31 For a complete list of the decisions of the states which rejected the rule,
see Berman and Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Uncon-
stiitutional Search and Seizure-Federal Problems, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 525,
532 n.39 (1960).
32242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
331 d. at 24-25, 150 N.E. at 589. For similar conclusions, see also State
v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 235-36, 125 AtI. 636, 638-39 (1924); Eleuteri
v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 511-12, 141 A.2d 46, 49-50 (1958).
3 Similar conclusions were drawn by Justice Murphy in his dissent in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-44 (1949). See also People v. Cahan,
44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12, 50 A.L.R.2d 513, 521-22 (1955).
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of dissatisfaction with the remedial methods of the states for en-
forcing the right of privacy. Rather it is to impose upon the
states a procedure which to a greater extent should prevent the
breach of the right in the first place. It is this interest in
preventing the breach of the right rather than giving a sufficient
remedy that is at the heart of this decision. The majority may
well be correct in concluding that unless the breach of the right
of privacy can be prevented, then the right itself is a nullity.
It will be for future cases to decide whether the totality of
federal case law on the exclusionary rule will also apply to the
states. Several of the states which had accepted the rule prior
to the instant case had exceptions to its application .35  The effect
of this decision on such state law is doubtful, but it would seem
that, rather than apply the totality of federal law. the Court will
decide each case in relationship to the test applied in the instant
case-does it conform to the requirements of due process.
)X
CRIMINAL LAW--APPEALS-POOR PERSON'S APPEAL FROM
DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS REFUSED WHERE ISSUES HAD PRIOR
ADEQUATE REVIE.-Defendant filed notice of appeal from the
county court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus but took no
further steps to perfect it, instead appealing from the conviction
to the Appellate Division and attacking the judgment on the same
grounds he had relied upon in the habeas corpus proceeding. The
conviction was affirmed by both the Appellate Division and the
Court of Appeals. Defendant then moved for leave to have appeal
from the habeas corpus denial heard as a "poor person." The
motion was denied, and the appeal dismissed. From this dismissal
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that where
it appears from either the moving papers or the court's own
records that the question sought to he reviewed in a post-conviction
hearing has already been passed upon, the indigent defendant may
not prosecute the appeal at public expense, "adequate appellate
review" having been granted. People v. Martin, 9 N.Y.2d 351,
174 N.E.2d 475, 214 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1961).
"[A] State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review," 1 but if provided,
35For example, South Dakota and Wisconsin refuse to supress evidence
because of technical irregularities in the search warrant. S.D. CoDE § 34.1102
(Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. §963.08 (1958).
1 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
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